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WHAT LIES BENEATH TROUBLED WATERS:
THE DETERMINATION OF NAVIGABLE RIVERS
IN PPL MONTANA, LLC V. MONTANA, 132 S.CT.
1215 (2012)
AMY WEGNER KHO'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently in PPL Montana v. Montana, the Supreme Court of the
United States ("Court") rejected the State of Montana's claims of title to
riverbeds beneath privately owned hydroelectric power plants. The question presented a test of whether three factual determinations of navigability still apply as they have in the past. The three factual questions at issue
were: (1) whether the segment-by-segment analysis is appropriate; (2)
whether portage defeats navigability; and (3) whether modern modes of
travel can provide evidence of navigability that would not exist otherwise.
As detailed below, the Court affirmed that determinations of navigability
for purposes of deciding riverbed ownership remain the distinctive questions of fact to be proved. Due to the importance of ownership of title to
riverbeds, this critical affirmation provides more stability for the future,
as states will not be able to take land from the federal government 100
years after the fact.
The case at hand considered the issue of riverbeds beneath particular
segments of rivers where the water was so rough that river travelers had to
steer around them. It is the land beneath these troubled waters where
the controversy lies.' States cannot make rulings by determining navigability of rivers that would retroactively grant more land to the state than it
2
actually received upon admission into the United States.
The doctrine of navigability is a common law doctrine that determines whether a State or the Federal government owns title to riverbeds.
The Court's decision confirmed several aspects of the strictures of the
doctrine of navigability for purposes of determining state title to riverbeds, a matter governed by federal law and determined at the date of
statehood according to the equal footing doctrine. The law grants States
the title to the beds of rivers that were navigable in fact at the time of
statehood, while those unnavigable at the time of statehood remain with
the federal government to be granted or sold as part of the federal domain.
* With thanks to Alexandra Davis at Vranesh & Raisch, L.L.C., for review and
comments.
1. PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215 (2012).
2. Id. at 1235.
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On February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court decided the contested

PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana case.3 Although the case started in 2003
as a suit by parents looking to raise money for their children's school
against a power company, it quickly became a dispute between the State
and Federal governments. 4 The parents of Montana school children
sought compensation from the hydroelectric power company, PPL Montana, LLC ("PPL"), for their rent-free use of state-owned riverbeds underneath a number of the company's'hydroelectric dams.5
Issues addressed by the Supreme Court included the distinction between "navigability" for purposes of title and "navigability" in a regulatory
context; the importance of analyzing the navigability of a river on a segment-by-segment approach; and whether evidence of modern day usage
of a river may be relied upon in determining navigability at the time of
statehood. The court held that: (1) the State did not hold title to riverbed
segments that were unnavigable at the time of statehood due to the equal
footing doctrine; (2) the 17-mile Great Falls reach of the Missouri Riverfrom the head of the first waterfall to the foot of the last-was unnavigable; (3) the modern recreational use of the Madison River in Montana
did not prove the river was navigable at the time of statehood; and (4) the
reliance by the utility company and its forerunners upon Montana's long
failure to assert title to riverbeds was evidence to support the conclusion
that the river segments were unnavigable.6 The Court held that the Montana Supreme Court had erred in its application of these rules and remanded the matter back to the Montana Courts for further proceedings.

II.

BACKGROUND

The focus of this controversy lies in ownership of the land beneath
the troubled waters of three Montana Rivers.7 PPL, a Delaware based
limited liability company, owns ten facilities that rest on the riverbeds of
the Upper Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork Rivers.8 The Court expressed great interest in the histories of these three rough rivers. 9 In addition to examining the procedural posture and the facts in the case, the
Court also spent a great deal of time focusing on the rivers and the historical records describing the Montana rivers at the time of Montana's
statehood.'o The Court examined historical texts, encyclopedias, and
journals from Lewis and Clark's historic expedition in order to discover
as many facts as possible about the navigable nature of the three rivers at
Montana's statehood in 1889.."
3.
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The specific hydroelectric facilities, or dams, that PPL owns include
the Thompson Falls Project, built in 1915 and located on the Clark Fork
River, and the Missouri-Madison Project on the Missouri and Madison
Rivers.12 The Federal Government originally licensed the Thompson
Falls facility in 1949, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") re-licensed it in 1979." The dams on the Madison and Missouri river, built between 1891 and 1958, are together called the "Missouri-Madison Project" and were relicensed by FERC on September 27,

2000.14
PPL bought the Thompson Falls and Missouri-Madison Projects
from the Montana Power Company on December 17, 1999." Although
some of the dams were over 100 years old when PPL bought them, Montana had never once sought rent from those previous owners-this made it
all the more confusing when, PPL found itself in the middle of a legal
whirlpool just four years later. 6 Suddenly, the idea of demanding rent
became very important to the parents of some Montana school children,
who then sued PPL based on the premise that the riverbeds underneath
the dams were part of the school trust lands and PPL was thus dutybound to pay rent for using the school trust lands for their hydroelectric
power plants."
Despite the fact that Montana had never previously sought payment
for the use of the state-owned riverbeds, the State decided to join in the
federal suit against PPL, filing its own complaint and requesting compensation from PPL under the school trust theory and also under the Hydroelectric Resources Act." Suddenly the case became more than just a
dispute over payment-it was now about sovereignty.
After being dismissed by the federal court for lack of diversity jurisdiction,' 9 PPL and two other power companies sued Montana in the First
Judicial District Court of Montana, seeking a declaratory judgment action
against the State and contesting Montana's power to seek compensation
for riverbed rent at the FERC-licensed dams on the Clark Fork, Missouri,
and Madison Rivers. 20 In a counterclaim, Montana argued for ownership
of the riverbeds based on the equal-footing doctrine, and thus demanded
the requisite rent from PPL for using the land. 2' The Montana trial court
granted summary judgment to Montana ruling that the state owned the
riverbeds and ordering PPL to pay back rents of $40,956,180 for use of
the riverbeds between 2000 and 2007.22 The Montana Supreme Court
12.
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v. Montana, at 1225.
v. State, 229 P.3d at 427.
v. Montana, at 1225.
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("court") affirmed reasoning that "navigability for title purposes is very
liberally construed."2 3 The court found that independent review of case
law in this area "establishes unequivocally" that the lower court's decision
was correct in determining that the navigability for title test was "somewhat fluid." 24 The court found the case law to suggest a very "narrow
rule,." that while rivers do not have to have experienced "actual use" at
the time of statehood, they must show the potential of providing passage
for steam or sail vessels so as to be viewed as a thoroughfare for interstate
commerce. 25 In addition, the court embraced the idea that modern navigation and commerce could be "retroactively applied to considerations of
navigability." 26
The United States Supreme Court's review of this case arose from a
petition of certiorari from the Montana Supreme Court's affirmation of
the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the state.27

III. SUPREME COURT DECISION
PPL argued that the Montana Supreme Court's decision was incorrect for several reasons. 28 First, the court failed to analyze the segments
of the rivers in question with enough care to determine whether they were
navigable in fact. 29 Second, the court improperly addressed the question
of portage and whether the necessity of portage defeated navigability and
mistakenly relied on evidence of modern-day use on the Madison River
to determine navigability.30 Finally, the court erred by relying on the be3
lief that any other decision would undermine the public trust doctrine. 1
The United States joined PPL as amicus curiae in support of PPL's arguments. 32
After taking a historical detour through the geography of Montana,
the United States Supreme Court began analyzing the case by discussing
the two legal principles that control the case: the doctrine of navigable
waters, and the equal-footing doctrine.3 3
The navigability doctrine under English common law created the basis for the American law that gives states title to riverbeds beneath navigable waters as sovereigns.34 In England, the courts distinguished between
tidal waters and nontidal waters, as tidal waters were royal rivers and non-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

PPL Montana v. State, 229 P.3d at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446-47.
PPL Montana v. Montana, at 1226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Issue 2

CASE NOTES

493

tidal were considered to be public highways. 5 The English Crown held
title to the land beneath the royal rivers, but the public had the right of
passage and right to fish in the waters.3 6 Private owners held the title of
the riverbed and soil of nontidal waters, however, as with the royal rivers,
3
the public still had right of passage over these public highways. 7 Early
American law adopted the English common law for riverbed title. That
law evolved to the point that "a State holds presumptive title to navigable
waters whether or not the waters are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide." 38 This title rule, known as navigability in fact, generally deems waters navigable only when they are in fact. 9
The equal-footing doctrine states that upon admission into the United
States, each new state enters with the same or equal rights as the original
states; this creates a "federal constitutional significance" in the rules for
state riverbed title. 40 Less than seventy years after the United States declared its independence, the Supreme Court ruled that, based on sovereignty the 13 original states "'hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters and the soil under them, subject only to rights surrendered and
41
This
powers granted by the Constitution to the federal government."
was consistent with the Constitutional premise that the federal government had only those specific powers ceded by the States and no more.
Under the equal-footing doctrine, upon statehood, the state gains title
to the land beneath navigable rivers. 4 2 The navigability in fact doctrine
asserts "those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact." 43 The test for navigability in fact is whether
rivers "are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.""
Navigability is a question of fact determined at the time of statehood and
by the "natural and ordinary condition" of the river. 4 5 The Montana Supreme Court misapplied the test for navigability and used the test in the
context of interstate commerce to determine admiralty jurisdiction, which
allows a waterway to be determined navigable even if not originally so but
was later improved or changed to allow commerce.4 6 However, in the test
for navigability in fact, the analysis focuses only on navigation and not on
interstate travel." 47
35.
36.
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Id.
Id. at 1226-27.
Id. at 1227.
Id. (see, Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810)).
PPL Montana v. Montana. at 1227.
Id.
Id. (quoting Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842)).
Id. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1228 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871)).
Id.
Id. at 1228 (see, Oklahoma at 591, 42 S.Ct. 406).
Id.
Id. at 1228-29.
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Thus, under American common law, the English common law and
the equal-footing doctrine dictate title to riverbeds. The United States
Supreme Court addressed several issues that arose in the lower court's
ruling: (1) whether the segments of the rivers are navigable in fact; (2) if
the necessity of portages defeat navigable rivers; (3) if present-day recreation on the Madison River establishes navigability; (4) and if an alternate
ruling would undermine the public trust doctrine. Because its rulings on
these four issues was enough to reverse the lower court's grant of summary judgment, the Court did not reach the question of whether the
Montana Supreme Court erred in respect to the burden of proof regarding navigability.48 The Court's analysis of these questions provides affirmation that title indeed vests at statehood and establishes stability for
future uses of riverbeds.
A.

NAVIGABLE IN FACT

Justice Kennedy wrote that the "primary flaw in the reasoning of the
Montana Supreme Court lies in its treatment of the question of river segments and overland portage."4 9 These two questions are important factual questions that determine whether a river is navigable.
1. Segments: River as a Whole or River in Part
In order to evaluate the correct title to submerged lands under the
equal-footing doctrine, the Supreme Court adjudicates a river based on a
segment-by-segment analysis to determine whether each specific section
of river is navigable."o In support of its ruling in favor of State title, the
Montana Supreme Court had dismissed the segment-by-segment method,
referring to it as "a piecemeal classification of navigability-with some
stretches declared navigable, and others declared non-navigable." The
United States Supreme Court called this "an unequivocal error" noting
that the segment-by-segment approach to navigability for title is "well settled."" In the PPL decision, the Court relied on precedent set in United

States v. Utah, noting
the controversy relates only to the sections of the rivers which are described in the complaint . . . even where the navigability of a river,

speaking generally, is a matter of common knowledge, and hence one of
which judicial notice may be taken, it may yet be a question, to be determined upon evidence, how far navigability extends 52
In Utah, the Court examined the Colorado River, section by section,
and pointed out the importance of determining the specific locations
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1229.
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Id. at 1229 (quoting PPL Montana v. State, at 448-49.)
Id. (quoting Utah, 283 U.S. 64, at 77).
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wheye the river is no longer navigable." Here, the Court examined legal
precedent court determined navigability in fact section by section, evaluating whether the rivers in question were "navigable in fact at the locus in

quo."54
Further, the Court noted that in addition to legal precedent, other
matters also encouraged segmentation, including the physical features of
a river." When a river stretches across a wide expanse of geography,
each segment of river can be vastly different from another." For example, the Missouri River runs over 2,000 miles from steep mountains with
waterfalls to rapids where the river foams and splashes to flat plains with
a multitude of agricultural diversion ditches where the river moves significantly slower.57 The Missouri River is much different at the headwaters in Montana than it is when it joins the Mississippi River; thus, the
segment-by-segment approach would be the only accurate way to determine navigability in fact."
The segment-by-segment approach to determining riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine is also in accord with the ways in which
riparian landowners allocate riverbed title, as each owner owns bed and
soil along the length of his adjacent land." The Supreme Court noted
that, despite the fact that the Montana Supreme Court held that segmentation is "inadministrable," it had enough information to "divide up and
apportion" the river segments in order to appraise the land and place a
value on unpaid rents owed by PPL.60 The Supreme Court determined
from the facts that a number of the specific sections of rivers at issue here
are "both discrete6 1 as defined by physical features characteristic of navigability or unnnavigability, and substantial, as a matter of administrability
for title purposes. 62
Thus, the segment-by-segment approach to determining a river's
navigability for title has been well established under legal precedent, encouraged by the distinct physical features of a river, and is supported by a
long history of riparian landowners claiming title to riverbeds. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the lower court erred in disregard for the

53. Id. (quoting Utah at 90).
54. Id. (quoting Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 85
(1922) where the segment of "the Arkansas River that ran along the Osage Indian Reservation was navigable, and thus, whether the United States originally, and the Osages as
its grantees, unequivocally held title to the riverbeds because the Arkansas River 'is and
was not navigable at the place where the river bed lots, here in controversy, are"').
55. Id. at 1230.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (a specific example of the discrete locations of the segments is the Great Falls
section of the Upper Missouri River, with five waterfalls and rapids along 17 miles of the
river).
62. Id. at 1231.
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segment-by-segment approach in determining river navigability for title.63
This decision affirms long established law regarding the methods for determining navigability.
2. Portages
When a segment of a river is so turbulent, or has obstacles that prevent a boat from passing through the section, the boat and cargo must be
lifted out of the river and carried to a point where the river is once again
navigable, and this action is termed "portage." Thus, the second issue
arising in this case was whether the need to portage defeats navigability
with PPL arguing that portage seems to underscore the inability to navigate that segment of river.
Using the "short interruptions" approach, the Montana Supreme
Court ruled that the Great Falls reach was navigable because it could be
M
managed by way of land route portage."6
The court held that the section-by-section approach to determining navigability in fact was not defeated by a "short interruption" where portage was necessary.s According
to the lower court, these short interruptions of travel along the Montana
rivers, where travelers were forced to carry their boats and cargo over
waterfalls, rapids or past other obstructions, was not enough to defeat
navigation even if the short interruption was several miles and required
days added onto the journey. 66
In its analysis, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed letters and journals written during the Lewis and Clark expedition in 1805,
and noted that when Lewis and Clark reached the Great Falls section of
the Missouri River the rapids were so rough that the explorers had to
abandon their larger boats and haul their canoes and supplies out of the
river and carry them around eighteen miles over land, which took at least
11 days.67 The Court affirmed that the length of time it took to traverse
the rough sections of river did not matter, as "even if portage were to take
travelers only one day, its significance is the same: it demonstrates the
need to bypass the river segment, all because that part of the river is unnavigable." 6 ' This test of portages on the navigability in fact of rivers
states that if the obstruction is significant enough that it makes travels on
the river get out of the boat in order to traverse the obstacle the river is
unnavigable in fact at that location.6 9 Therefore, the lower court erred in
its statement concerning the rough sections of river in question that portages "are not sufficient to defeat a finding of navigability."'0

63.
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Id. at 1229.
PPL Montana v. State, 229 P.3d at 449.
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Id.
PPL Montana v. Montana, at 1231.
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Id. (quoting PPL Montana v. Montana, 229 P.3d, at 446).
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In reaching its conclusion that the court misapplied this Court's decision in The Montello,7 the Supreme Court noted that
Itlhe consideration of portage in The Montello was for a different purpose .

.

. not upon navigability in fact but upon whether the river was a

navigable water of the United States ... 72 Itlhe latter inquiry is doctrinally distinct, turning upon whether the river 'forms by itself, or by its
connection with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is, or may be, carried with other States or foreign countries in the
customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water7 3
However, in regards to navigability in fact, if the segment of river is so
obstructed that portage is necessary, then that segment of the river is unnavigable.
B.

RECREATION ON THE MADISON RIVER

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Montana's highest court erred again in relying on evidence of modern use of recreational
boats on the.Madison River to show the river was navigable. 74 The correct analysis for using modern day river usage to show navigability for title
purposes, requires a party to prove "the watercraft are meaningfully similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at the time of statehood;
and the river's post-statehood condition is not materially different from
its physical condition at statehood." 5 However, if the boats used to navigate the river in the present allow "navigability where the historical watercraft would not, or if the river has changed in ways that substantially improve its navigability, then the evidence of present-day use has little or no
bearing on navigability at statehood."" The Montana Supreme Court's
ruling did not show that it made these findings or that the watercraft used
at the time of statehood was similar to recreational boats currently used;
therefore, the court erred as a matter of law on its reliance on this modern, recreational use of the Madison River."
Evidence presented must show that the river, at the time of statehood, could allow commercial use that might have occurred in 1889,
such as travel and customary business." In addition, the Court believed
that the state supreme court failed to adequately study the changes of the
river's flow movement throughout Montana's state history, as these

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at1231.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1234.
Id.at 1233-34.
Id.
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changes could dramatically change navigability and might actually cause it
to be easier to navigate now than at statehood.7 9
The Court ruled that while the lower court was correct in that a navigable river "need not be susceptible of navigation at every point during
the year, neither can that susceptibility be so brief that it is not a commercial reality."80 The recreational activity occurring on the river currently could not be used as evidence proving navigability for title purposes at statehood and the lower court's reliance on such evidence without further investigation was "wrong as a matter of law." 8' Thus, the
Court's decision now provides important stability in maintaining that the
navigability test applies as of the time of statehood.
C.

UNDERMINING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The state of Montana also contended that if the lands beneath the
Montana rivers do not belong to the state, it will be a blow to the public
trust doctrine, "which concerns public access to the waters above those
beds for purposes of navigation, fishing, and other recreational uses."8 2
However, the Court states that Montana's argument shows the State's
misinterpretation of the public trust doctrine." This additional argument
is interesting because it attempts to bring modern day resource values to a
simple question of ownership.
The public trust doctrine is ancient, tracing its history as far back as
the Roman Empire, and more recently the tidal rivers owned by the English crown and the early history of the United States.84 "Unlike the equalfooting doctrine, however, which is the constitutional foundation for the
navigability rule of riverbed title, the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law, subject as well to the federal power to regulate vessels and
navigation under the Commerce Clause and admiralty power."" While
case precedent gives authority for states to take title to the land beneath
rivers to hold in trust for public good, the public trust doctrine too arises
from from state law rather than the Constitution.86 Federalism principles
give states the power to establish the breadth of the public trust over waters within their state, while federal law allows the equal-footing doctrine
to control riverbed title."
The public trust doctrine has many ramifications that mere ownership
does not. For example, where the public trust doctrine exists, a third
party may sue the state and water users to prevent certain actions that are
against the public trust. By refusing to tie navigability in fact, which is a
79.
80.
81.
82.
83,
84.
85.
86.
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question of title, to the public trust doctrine, the Court maintained a
bright line distinction between federal common law and state law.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the lower court's
ruling, that Montana owned the land beneath the three contested rivers,
showed an "infirm legal understanding" of the "rules of navigability for
title under the equal-footing doctrine.""8 States cannot make rulings by
determining navigability of rivers that would retroactively grant more land
to the state than it actually received at the state's admission into the
United States." The Court reversed the lower court's ruling, and remanded the case. 90
This case seems to suggest that the Court might be departing from its
traditional precedent in dealing with state courts, instead of reviewing
errors in applying federal law and remanding for retrial, the Court's ruling that the Great Falls section was unnavigable potentially suggests a shift
in the way the Court will deal with state court decisions in the future.
This case reached the Supreme Court from the petitioner's writ of certiorari, not a claim under federal law demanding a judgment; however, the
Court still treats this case as an appeal from a lower court.9 1
In regards to the public trust doctrine, the Court emphasizes this as a
matter of state law not governed by the Constitution. The Court's treatnent of the public trust doctrine was interesting in its limitations on the
definition of the doctrine. While the Court explained that the public
trust doctrine is a matter of state law, it's definition of the doctrine was
narrow, "the public trust doctrine...concerns public access to the waters
above those Iriverlbeds for purposes of navigation, fishing, and other
recreational uses."92 It is intriguing that the short list enumerated by the
Court does not include other common public uses such as environmental
protection and commerce. In future public trust doctrine cases, it should
be fascinating to see effects of this ruling and its limited enumeration of
public trust uses, specifically whether it applies solely in the realm of state
law. The principles of federalism enunciated in PPL Montana v. Montana would support the theory that in the future the public trust doctrine
is for the states to apply, but not for determining title or navigability in
fact.
88. Id. at 1235.
89. Id. at 1235.
90. Id.
91. Thomas W. Merrill, Opinion Analvsis: Montana Dunked on Riverbeds,
SCOTUS Blog. (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:03 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/opinion-analysis-montana-dunked-on-riverbeds/ (As
Prof. Merrill notes, "Ordinarily, when the Court reviews a decision of a state supreme
court, it will correct errors in federal law, and remand for application of the correct legal
principles [in the instant case, an accurate application of the navigability-for-title testi by
the state courts.")
92. PPL Montana v. Montana at 1234.
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CONCLUSION

On remand to Montana State Court, the United States Supreme
Court ordered that the lower court reassess their findings on navigability
based on the principles set forth in the opinion. However, the Court also
ruled that the Great Falls section of the Upper Missouri River was unnavigable in fact. That holding, and the fact that five of the ten hydroelectric facilities are in the Great Falls section, indicates that Montana
might not succeed at retrial in their claims that all three rivers are navigable and that the riverbeds are therefore public lands owned by Montana.
The Court affirmed the traditional methods of determining title of
rivers and that navigable rivers are navigable in fact. Sections of rivers
that are obstructed by rapids or waterfall preventing navigation are unnavigable. If the rivers are troubled to the degree that boats must be
lifted out of the river and carried on land, those segments are unnavigable. Modern day use of the river by recreational rafting or fishing does
not mean the river was navigable in fact at the time of statehood without
meeting the specific elements of the test.
Finally, by refusing to tie the title issue of navigability in fact to the
public trust doctrine, the Court maintained a bright line distinction between federal common law and state law. This decision solidifies the fact
that individual states cannot make rulings by determining navigability of
rivers that would retroactively grant more land to the state than it had
originally received at the date it entered the union.

